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The existing literature establishes that there exists inefficiency in energy consumption in 
Pakistan. In particular, with regard to electricity consumption, the problem of moral hazard is 
prevalent in the public sector. In this study, we observe this aspect by focusing on the 
behaviour of consumers once they are held liable to monitoring with the associated punishment 
mechanism. By providing evidence from a field experiment, we make three conclusions. First, 
individuals respond to both the monetary and non-monetary punishments. Alternatively, with 
the introduction of punishments, they reduce moral hazard with respect to electricity 
consumption. Second, the habitual violators of rules reform their behaviour after they are made 
accountable for their actions. Third, if appropriate monitoring systems along with the 
associated punishment mechanism are introduced, we can have beneficial effects in terms of 
resolving the energy crisis on the aggregate level.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Moral hazard refers to a situation where economic agents maximise their benefits 
in an inefficient way. Alternatively, in situations of moral hazard, economic agents are 
able to avoid the costs associated with their conduct.
1
 Moral hazard usually occurs due to 
asymmetric information which involves both ‘hidden actions’ and ‘hidden information’ 
[Arrow (1985)]. For instance, workers’ shirking which is costly for the employers to 
monitor and carelessness in precautions taken by the insured are the examples of hidden 
actions. Likewise, superior information of experts related to services such as those of the 
physicians, lawyers, masons, managers, politicians etc. are the examples of hidden 
information. The issue with moral hazard is that the agents’ actions and the consequences 
of those actions cannot be separated. A feasible solution would be to either make agents 
liable for the outcomes of their actions or deter them from the actions which involve 
moral hazard. 
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1Formally, according to Kotowitz (1989), moral hazard is defined as actions of economic agents in 
maximising their own utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not bear the full 
consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete 
or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible. 
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To our knowledge, there is no systematic study which discusses the issue of moral 
hazard in the context of monitoring, detection or the associated punishment mechanism. 
However, there are related studies which analyse the impact of monitoring or punishment 
in circumstances pertaining to other social dilemmas. For instance, one such dilemma is 
the contribution to public good which agents try to evade in the absence of monitoring or 
punishment. In this type of literature, the framework of public good games is used in 
order to observe the behaviour of individuals with regard to their contribution to the 
provision of non-excludable public goods.
2
 The experimental evidence in this regard 
shows that, on average, the participants in public good games contribute between 40 
percent and 60 percent of their endowment [Camerer (2003)]. However, in repeated 
games, the contribution declines due to the problem of free-riding. Alternatively, free-
riding results in the break of cooperation in case of public goods [Ostrom (2000); and 
Fischbacher, et al. (2001)]. Thus, in order to avoid free-riding or control the disruption of 
cooperation, there should be some type of social sanctioning.
3
 Social sanctioning can 
discipline the defectors which results in higher contributions to public goods. According 
to Fehr and Gächter (2002), if agents in a public good game are provided with the power 
to sanction others; then the level of cooperation would increase. In sharp contrast, 
Nikiforakis (2008) shows that punishment enhances cooperation; however, peer 
punishment in a decentralised framework declines due to the fear of counter punishment. 
In addition to the game-theoretic literature, there are also studies which discuss moral 
hazards in different situations. For example, Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) assert that 
the issue of moral hazard can be resolved in the principal-agent model if the agents are 
sensitised morally.
4
 Likewise, Itoh (2004) proclaims that the presence of other-regarding 
preferences is of central concern in resolving the issue of moral hazard. We also have 
some other suggestions for minimising moral hazards like peer pressure in team work 
[Corgnet, et al. (2015)]; the recommendation of deductible in insurance [Raaij (2016)]; 
prudential regulations in financial sector [Hellmann, et al. (2000)] etc.  
In general, the concept of moral hazard comes from the insurance industry which 
provides a way to transfer risk to somebody else.
5
 Here, we define moral hazard in a 
different context; i.e. we define it in terms of the misuse of electricity consumption in 
public sector. In Pakistan, there is inefficiency with regard to the consumption of 
electricity in public sector [Khan, et al. (2016)].
6
 In this study, we discuss this type of 
inefficiency in the context of monitoring and the associated punishment mechanism. We 
conjecture that the introduction of punishment would have beneficial effects in reducing 
such inefficiency. For our analysis, we focus on a public sector university, i.e. Quaid-i-
 
2For instance, according to Olson (1965), in case of public goods, one has to choose contribution for the 
provision of those goods where free-riding is preferable. 
3See, for instance, Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2002); Kritikos and Bolle (2004); 
Gintis, et al. (2005); Fowler (2005); Henrich, et al. (2006); Rockenbach and Milinski (2006); and Sigmund, 
(2007); Casari and Luini (2009); Faillo, et al. (2013); Bortolotti, et al. (2015) for details.  
4In particular, they show that adding moral sensitivity increases the descriptive, prescriptive, and 
pedagogical usefulness of the principal-agent model. 
5For example, an insurance company will pay up if you damage a rental car. However, the concept has 
wider applications in other fields of economics. See, for instance, Nyman (1999) in case of health economics. 
6For instance, according to Khan, et al. (2016), in hostels of public sector universities, the monthly 
consumption of electricity per student is 46.2 units as compared to 19.58 units in private hostels and an average 
of 20.5 units in households. 
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Azam University (QAU), Islamabad, which is a typical public sector organisation of 
Pakistan. In most of the public sector universities in Pakistan, the employees and students 
are not charged for the electricity that they consume during the working hours and 
studies, respectively.
7
 This is justified by the fact that universities’ fees in public sector 
are subsidised in Pakistan. Likewise, in hostels of the public sector universities, the 
consumption of electricity is exclusively made by the resident students. In case of hostels, 
students are charged in lump sum for their hostel rents, utilities, and other services. 
Alternatively, they are not charged an extra amount for the over-consumption of  
electricity that they might make. Due to these factors, there exists the problem of moral 
hazard in hostels of the public sector universities as far as the consumption of electricity 
is concerned. Khan, et al. (2016) find that students in the public sector hostels misuse 
electricity by free riding on the non-consumers of public sector.  
Students in the hostels of QAU are allowed to use lights, fans and irons in their 
rooms. Other electric appliances such as heater, water heating rods, and air conditioners 
are not allowed. However, in the presence of organisational inefficiency with respect to 
monitoring, it is very difficult to restrain students from using such prohibited appliances. 
In order to regulate students in this regard, we have to raise the intrinsic and extrinsic 
costs of misuse of the electricity.
8
 In this study, we focus on the extrinsic costs by 
introducing monitoring with a specified punishment mechanism in a field experiment. 
We use “keeping lights switched on in a locked room” as a proxy for the misuse of 
electricity. The experiment comprises six treatments with varying levels of punishments. 
In the Baseline Treatment (BT), we conduct survey of all boys’ hostels for three 
consecutive days. During the survey, we count the number of locked rooms with inside 
lights switched on. In the second treatment, named as Soft Notice Treatment (SNT), we 
display an appeal on the notice boards of all boys’ hostel which suggests judicious use of 
electricity in the hostels. After two days of the appeal, we conduct the survey again by 
counting the number of locked rooms with their inside lights switched on. We repeat this 
process for four more treatments by introducing different levels of punishments. For 
instance, in the third treatment, named as Harsh Notice Treatment (HNT), we introduce 
harsh words in the appeal. Likewise, in the fourth treatment, named as Warning Notice 
Treatment (WNT), we warn the students of an associated fine with the misuse of 
electricity. In addition to displaying the warning notices on notice boards, during this 
treatment, the notices of warning were also delivered in all rooms. Finally, in the fifth and 
sixth treatments, i.e. Fine of Five hundred rupees Treatment (FFT) and Fine of One 
thousands rupees Treatment (FOT), respectively, we introduce monetary punishment. As 
stated earlier, we conduct the survey for three consecutive days in all of the treatments in 
order to count the number of locked rooms with their inside lights switched on. We find 
 
7In Pakistan, in most of the public sector universities, the consumption of electricity can be decomposed 
into three types. First is the electricity that is used in the common places like class rooms, libraries, laboratories, 
street lights etc. Second category is the consumption of electricity, made specifically by the employees in 
offices etc. Finally, there is also another category which is made exclusively by the students in their hostels. In 
the first two categories, the consumption is mainly paid by the universities as the university fees in the public 
sector are subsidised. Thus, the consumption of electricity is like a public good. In other words, the employees 
and students may free ride on public sector. Similarly, in the third case, there may be a probability of moral 
hazard with regard to the electricity consumption. 
8For instance, for raising the intrinsic costs, we have to morally train the students. Likewise, for 
extrinsic costs, we have to provide efficient monitoring and punishment mechanism. 
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that the introduction of monitoring with punishment makes the students significantly 
careful about the misuse of electricity. In other words, the number of locked rooms with 
their inside lights switched on significantly declines with the introduction of punishment. 
The rest of the paper is organised in five sections. Section 2 provides a review of 
literature. Section 3 describes the trends in the energy crisis of Pakistan and, in addition, 
it briefly discusses the earlier findings in this regard. In Section 4, we describe the 
experimental procedure, and discuss the treatments and hypotheses of the study. Section 
5 discusses the results of our analysis while Section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There is considerable literature which highlights the implications of punishments 
for economic behaviour. As is mentioned earlier, most of the existing studies are 
undertaken in the context of public good games.
9
 However, besides controlled 
experiments, there are studies which test the impact of punishment in an environment of 
natural experiments. For instance, Elbla (2012) explores the role of punishment in 
reforming the behaviour of students in schools. In particular, the study finds that both the 
verbal and corporal punishments have negative impact on students’ behaviour and 
personality in Khartoum, Sudan. In a similar way, Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) 
investigate the impact of punishment on deterring people from the violation of laws.
10
 
Traffic signals in Israel and San Francisco are used as testing beds for the experiment. 
The data on cars passed through the red lights was collected by the installed cameras.
11
 
The behaviour of drivers was observed before and after the increase in fine. The results 
show that increase in fine sharply decreases the violation of crossing the red lights. On 
average, the criminally convicted individuals cross red lights more than the non-
convicted ones; however, in terms of elasticity, the response of both towards fine is 
almost similar. Also, youngsters and people with old cars have higher elasticity with 
respect to fine as compared to older individuals and people having new cars, respectively. 
In terms of ethnicity, the minority groups in Israel show lower response towards an 
increase in fine. 
Likewise, there are studies which focus on the level of optimal punishment in 
deterring some crimes. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), in this regard, provide a 
comparative static analysis of punishment in a public good game.
12
 In particular, they 
focus on both the effectiveness of punishment and the amount by which the punishment 
can lessens the receivers’ income. In each treatment of the experiment, the individuals 
were initially endowed with fixed amount of money and the participants  decided 
simultaneously how much to contribute for a public good.
13
 The results indicate that 
contributions increase monotonically with the increase in punishment. In particular, 
 
9See, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Nikiforakis (2008). 
10They examine the impact of punishment on deterrence across different personal characteristics such 
as age, criminal record, driving record and income.  
11The experimenter chooses red light signals at 8 intersections point of San Francisco and 73 
intersections points of Israel. 
12Through experiment, they examine the usefulness of four different levels of punishment in terms of 
contribution to a usual public good. The experiment comprises a repetitive linear public good game with two or 
more players.  
13The participants were not allowed to communicate with each other.  
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higher levels of punishment ensure full cooperation which results in enhancing welfare. 
However, punishment below a threshold level cannot prevent the deterioration of 
cooperation for the provision of public good. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies which directly examine the impact of 
punishment on behaviour in the context of misuse of electricity. However, we do find 
studies which are related to this aspect. For instance, Takeuchi and Mizobuchi (2012) 
examine whether the behaviour regarding the misuse of electricity can be reformed 
through incentives. The study is based on the residents of Matsuyama, a city of 
Japan. In order to see the impact of incentives on the reduction of electricity 
consumption and, thereby, the reduction in Carbon Dioxide (CO2), the behaviour of 
53 households was tested through the effect of monetary reward on the electricity 
consumption.
14
 The results show that 34 percent of the households successfully 
reduce their consumption of electricity with an average reduction rate of around 4.8 
percent. However, there were some households which did not respond to the 
economic incentives showing that, for some people, economic reward should be 
sufficiently high in order to incentivise them in this regard. The results also show 
that as the economic reward increases, the reduction of electricity consumption also 
increases. There also exist some experimental studies that test the impact of intrinsic 
motivation in addition to economic incentive on the conservation of energy. The 
review of such studies has been provided by Daniel, et al. (2016).  They discuss three 
streams of literature related to energy and water conservation. The first stream 
examines the impact of dynamic billing on the use of energy which shows that when 
consumers are charged high tariffs at peak time as compared to normal time, the 
average consumption decreases [Caves, et al. (1984); Jessoe and Rapson (2014); Ito, 
et al. (2015)]. The second stream shows that if people are provided information about 
how much do they consume relative to others; they reduce the consumption of 
electricity due to social comparison [Allcott (2011); Ayres, et al. (2012)].  An 
experiment related to our work is done by Delmas and Lessem (2014). They use non-
financial motive for checking the behaviour of residence halls with students who do 
not pay electricity bills in University of California Los Angeles (UCLA).  In addition 
to the standard private social comparison, they introduce a treatment that publicly 
displays which rooms on a floor are above the median consumption and find that 
public comparisons reduce energy use by 20 percent. The third stream of papers 
shows that people do not internalise the private cost due to inefficient investment in 
the energy sector. When they are sensitised, they start investing more and thus reduce 
the inefficient use of electricity [Allcott and Taubinsky (2015)]. 
In this study, we focus on the implications of punishment as deterrence for the 
misuse of electricity. Our sample includes hostels of Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), 
Islamabad. We observe the behaviour of students towards electricity consumption while 
we introduce different types and levels of monetary and non-monetary punishments. 
Punishments raise extrinsic costs of the agents for misusing electricity. This study is 
different from the available studies in the sense that actual punishment notices are 
delivered to students after they were found misusing the electricity.  
 
14The field experiment lasted 12 weeks from November 2010 to January 2011. 
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3.  TRENDS AND EARLIER FINDINGS OF THE ENERGY  
CRISIS IN PAKISTAN 
Electricity is one of the key energy sources and plays an important role in the 
economic activities of an economy. Almost all of the industrial as well as agricultural 
development is mainly based on the availability of electricity [Alter and Syed (2011)]. 
Pakistan is facing severe electricity shortfall since 2005.
15
 In particular, the existing 
production is not meeting the current demand of electricity. The overall demand of 
electricity grew by 23.5 percent between 1980 and 2011 [Kessides (2013)]. The shortfall 
in May 2012 was estimated at 6,000 Mega Watt (MW) [Ebrahim (2012); The Express 
Tribune (2011); National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) (2011a, 
2011b)]. It slightly declined to 4,250 in June, 2013 with demand standing at 16,400 MW 
and generation standing at 12,150; however, the gap is still alarming [Pakistan (2015)]. 
The predictions for the near future demonstrate that the gap between the demand and 
supply is likely to increase to 8,000 MW by 2017 and 13,000 MW by 2020 [Shahbaz 
(2011)]. 
The electricity crisis can be analysed from two perspectives, i.e. the supply side or 
the demand side. The supply side incorporates the production capacity as well as the 
issues related to the distribution and transmission of electricity from grid to the end users. 
As is stated earlier, production capacity of electricity is low in Pakistan with huge 
distributional losses. For instance, Pakistan, on average, wastes 20 to 25 percent of output 
of electricity through technical and non-technical losses. This wastage is significantly 
higher as compared to an average of 4 to 12 percent for developed countries [National 
Transmission and Dispatch Company Limited (NTDCL) (2011; 2014); NEPRA (2014)]. 
On the demand side, the inefficient use of electricity is of concern for Pakistan. 
According to Ullah, et al. (2014), 52 percent of the increase in energy intensity since 
1972 is caused by the inefficiency in the use of energy. This evidence is supplemented by 
the fact that Pakistan is far behind the developed as well as many developing countries in 
terms of energy efficiency. For instance, for each dollar of GDP, Pakistan is consuming 
15 percent more energy than India, and 25 percent more energy than the Philippines 
(Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FDP), 2010). In addition, according to FDP (2010), the 
energy consumption per unit of GDP for Pakistan is five times higher than the average of 
the developed countries; and it is two times higher than the world average. The potential 
saving due to the efficient use of energy in Pakistan is estimated at 18 percent which is 
equal to 11.16 Million Tons of Oil Equivalents (MTOE), resulting in 51 percent 
reduction in the net imports of oil [FDP (2010)].
16
 All of these trends imply that we have 
the potential of saving electricity through the demand side measures; however, so far, we 
have not been able to do so. Given these trends, there has been commendable research 
conducted on energy issues in Pakistan. However, most of the studies have been 
conducted in the context of changes in energy prices and their impact on economic 
growth, inflation and other macroeconomic indicators.
17
 To our knowledge, there is only 
 
15Although, the gap between demand and supply of electricity is growing for the last 30 years, the 
severity surfaced since 2005. 
16For instance, according to FDP (2010), the potential of energy saving just in the one fiscal year of 2008 
was estimated at 6.1 MTOE which corresponds to 15.4 percent of the total energy consumed in the country.  
17See, for instance Jamil and Ahmad (2010), Ashraf, et al. (2013), Shahbaz and Feridun (2012) etc.  
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one study, i.e. Khan, et al. (2016), on the micro perspective of energy crisis in Pakistan 
which shows that the consumption of electricity in public sector is inefficient. In this 
study, we contribute to this line of research by highlighting the importance of monitoring 
and punishment mechanisms in addressing  inefficiency.  
 
4.  EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES, TREATMENTS  
AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we describe the experimental procedure and provide details of all 
of the treatments. Also, we state the theoretical framework and the corresponding 
hypotheses of our analysis. 
 
4.1.  Experimental Procedure 
The expeirment was conducted in boys’ hostels of QAU. There are ten hostels and 
two annexes for the residence of students in QAU. Male students occupy six hostels; and 
the rest of the hostels are for female students. Based on convenience, the experiment was 
conducted in male hostels only.
18
 As shown in Table 1, the six boys’ hostels 
accommodated 1424 students. The experiment continued from October 27, 2015 to 
December 04, 2015. We conducted survey in all boys’ hostels for three consecutive days, 
i.e. Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in each week. As stated earlier, our purpose was to 
count the number of locked rooms with inside lights switched on. Keeping this purpose in 
view, the survey was mostly conducted at night from 7:00 PM to 9:00 PM. In this way, 
we could identify the resident students who misuse electricity.  
 
Table 1 
Description of the Boys Hostel of QAU 
Hostel No. Allocation of Students 
Number of 
Rooms 
Number of 
Seats 
Number of 
Seats per Room 
3 M.PHIL/PHD 102 204 Bi-Seaters 
4 M.PHIL/PHD 102 204 Bi-Seaters 
6 MSc(1
st
 and 2
nd
) 90 360 Four-Seaters 
7 BS(1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
) 52 208 Four-Seaters 
8 MSc(3
rd
 and upper) 112 224 Bi-Seaters 
9 BS(5
th
 and upper) 112 224 Bi-Seaters 
Total  570 1424  
Source: QAU Prospectus 2015-2016.   
Note: M.Sc. and M.Phil. are 4 semesters programmes while BS and PhD are 8 semesters programmes. 
 
18Future research can certainly replicate the study for female hostels. 
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4.2.  Experimental Treatments  
The experiment comprised six treatments. The details of each treatment are 
summarised in Table 2. In the Baseline Treatment (BT), we conducted a survey of all 
boys’ hostels and counted the number of locked rooms with inside lights switched 
on. In this treatment, there was no associated punishment. After the collection of data 
in BT, we arranged a meeting with the administration of hostels in order to ask for 
permission for displaying appeal on notice boards. After the approval of provost, the 
notice was prepared and displayed on all of the notice boards of boys’ hostels with 
the support of hostel administration. After the display of notice on notice boards in 
SNT, all of the rooms were surveyed in the same way as in the BT treatment. It is 
worth mentioning that notices were displayed on working days. The survey was 
conducted after a lapse of at least one day so as to allow students some space for 
reading the notices. Again, the survey was conducted for three consecutive days, i.e. 
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. The HNT was similar to the SNT, except the wording 
of the notices. Alternatively, this time the notice incorporated harsh words instead of 
soft request. Again, after the formal approval of hostel administration, the harsh 
notice was displayed on all of the notice boards of hostels. The notice in HNT 
advised the students to keep lights of the rooms switched off in their absence. The 
same notice also warned the students of the issuance of warning letter in case of any 
non-compliance. After the display of notice, again, the survey was conducted for 
three consecutive days from Friday to Sunday. In WNT, the notices were hand 
delivered to all rooms of Boys hostels. The notice was handed over to any of the 
resident students in their rooms. The wording of the notice was also relatively harsh 
than HNT. In FFT, each room was fined 500 rupees in case of non-compliance. The 
per student decomposition implies that, in bi-seater room, a student was fined 250 
rupees while, in four-seater room, each of the resident was fined 125 rupees. FOT 
was similar to FFT, except the amounts of fine. In FOT, the fine was raised to 1000 
rupees per room in case of non-compliance. Even, in this case, the fine on room 
implied equal distribution among the resident students. While delivering the fine 
notices, a copy was kept in the personal file of each student for record purpose.  Like, 
the previous treatments, in WNT, FFT, and FOT, the survey was conducted for three 
consecutive days. In the survey, we noted down the number of locked rooms with 
their inside lights switched on for each treatment. 
In this study, violation is defined as “locked room with inside light switched on” 
and is measured as “the percentage of locked rooms with inside lights switched on in the 
total locked rooms”. For each treatment, we take the average for both the total number of 
locked rooms with inside light switched on and the total number of locked rooms across 
the three times survey. We are interested in the decline in intensity of the violation, in this 
regard. However, we do not treat one-time violator and multiple-times violators 
differently, when we assign them the monetary punishment. This is the limitation of this 
study as we could not send fine notices on weekends.
19
  
 
19Treating one-time and multiple-times violators differently could trigger protest from students as 
students could ask that why they were not informed on the first violation, which was not possible 
administratively on weekends.  
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Table 2 
Details of Treatments  
Treatments 
Date of Notice Date of Survey Relevant Wording in the Notice20 
Baseline 
Treatment (BT) 
No Notice October 28  
November 2 and 
3, 2015 
No Notice 
 
Soft Notice 
Treatment 
(SNT) 
November 5, 
2015 
(Displayed on 
Notice Boards of 
Hostels) 
November 6, 7, 
8, 2015 
All the residents of the boys’ hostels are advised to 
switch-off the lights, fans etc. as they leave their 
respective rooms. 
Harsh Notice 
Treatment 
(HNT) 
November 11, 
2015 
(Displayed on 
Notice Boards of 
Hostels) 
November 13, 
14, 15, 2015 
All the residents of the boys’ hostels are strictly 
advised to switch-off lights and other electrical 
appliances etc., as they leave their respective rooms. 
In case of non-compliance, warning notices will be 
issued to all resident students of a room. 
Warning Notice 
Treatment 
(WNT) 
November 18, 
2015 
(Delivered to all 
Students of 
Hostels in their 
Rooms. In 
Locked Rooms, 
Notices were 
Dropped inside) 
November 20, 
21, 22, 2015 
It has been observed that, in spite of repeated notices 
issued by the office, the students do not switch off 
the lights of their rooms in their absence. It is sheer 
negligence and wastage of energy resources. 
Students are, therefore, finally warned to switch off 
all the lights and other electric appliances while 
leaving the room. In case of non-compliance, heavy 
fine will be imposed on the violators. 
Fine of Five 
hundred rupees 
Treatment (FFT) 
November 26, 
2015 
(Delivered to 
Violators only. 
The notice 
included Names, 
Department and 
Semester of all 
resident students 
of a room) 
November 27, 
28, 29, 2015 
In exercise of the powers vested in Provost under the 
clause 17(a) of QAU Hostel Regulations, 1996, the 
residents of the room are therefore fined Rs 500/- 
collectively (i.e. Rs.125/-each in four seater room 
and Rs 250/-each in bi-seater room). The students are 
therefore, directed to deposit the above mentioned 
fine into the authorised university account under 
intimation to this office by December 07, 2015. 
Failing to comply with instructions or refusing to 
receive the notification would be considered as 
another act of indiscipline or cognisable offence 
under the law. 
Fine of One 
thousand rupees 
Treatment 
(FOT) 
December 2, 
2015 
(Delivered to 
Violators only. 
The notice beared 
Names, 
Department and 
Semester of all 
resident students 
of a room) 
December 4, 5, 
6, 2015 
In exercise of the powers vested in Provost under 
clause 17(a) of QAU Hostel Regulations, 1996, the 
residents of the room are therefore fined Rs 1000/- 
collectively. All the residents of the room are, 
therefore, directed to deposit the above mentioned 
fine collectively into the authorised university 
account under intimation to this office by December 
10, 2015. Failing to comply with instruction or 
refusing to receive the notification would be 
considered as another act of indiscipline or 
cognisable offence under the law. 
 
4.3.  Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
20See detailed wording in Appendix. 
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As discussed above, Quaid-i-Azam University charges each student fixed amount of 
fee per semester for hostel. The fee includes room rent, furniture, utilities, and other related 
services. On average, the amount of fee remains the same for each student during the entire 
period of study. As the students are not charged separately for utilities, therefore, at the end 
of each month, the university pays all utility bills. The students usually remain unaware 
about the exact amount of units of electricity that they consume each month. If we take 
electricity as a consumer good for the student; then equilibrium implies that the marginal 
benefit from consumption must be equal to the marginal cost. The consumption of 
electricity is beneficial for a student when he remains in his room; however, once he leaves 
his room, then the marginal benefits become zero for him.
21
 In comparison, the marginal 
cost of electricity is independent of consumption as far as an individual student is 
concerned.
22
 In other words, we can say that the price of each additional unit of electricity is 
zero for each student. This discrepancy between the marginal benefit and marginal cost 
leaves no incentive for the students to conserve electricity. Accordingly, we might expect 
that the students will not be careful about switching off lights of the rooms in their absence. 
Thus, the probability of leaving the lights switched on in locked rooms increases with the 
misperception of students regarding the payment mechanism of electricity by the 
university.
23
 In order to motivate students for switching off lights in their absence, we have 
to enhance the marginal cost of switched-on lights in locked rooms. Alternatively, if the 
students are made liable for the cost of leaving lights switched on in locked rooms, we can 
reduce the misuse in electricity consumption. This is the focus of this paper where we want 
to see the impact in the notice treatments. 
In SNT, HNT and WNT, if the students do not read notice boards; then the 
behaviour of students across the BT and these treatments might not be different. Also, 
even after reading the notices, the effect might not be different across these treatments if 
the students take the message like a cheap talk and consider the warning a non-credible 
threat. The reason is that as per the information of hostel administration, the students 
were never given warning notices on leaving lights switched on inside a locked room. In 
contrast, in FFT and FOT, the behaviour of students might be different as compared to 
BT because the students are monetarily punished for leaving lights switched on in locked 
rooms. This is due to the fact that the marginal cost of misuse increases while the 
marginal benefit, which is zero, remains the same. Therefore, majority of students are 
likely to abstain from leaving lights switched on in locked rooms in the fine treatments. 
Based on the above discussion, the hypotheses of the study are given below: 
H1: The behaviour of students towards switching off lights in locked rooms is 
likely to be the same across BL and SNT, HNT and WNT. 
 
21For instance, he will need light for study, fans for cooling etc. when he is inside the room. 
22The reason is that the charges of electricity do not depend on the amount of consumed units of 
electricity. Rather it is fixed and collected in bulk at the time of fee submission at start of the semester. 
23The students fail to realise that the government funds universities for meeting their expenditure. This 
funding, in turn, is financed by the taxes which are either directly or indirectly paid by almost all of the citizens 
of Pakistan. Thus, the students who misuse electricity in the university hostels also pay taxes to government in 
the form of sales tax, mobile phone taxes etc. So, the cost of misusing electricity is to some extent paid by the 
students. As on average people are not much rational to perceive the complexities of all this process as is shown 
from the results of centipede game where player do not play equilibrium per backward induction. Hence, higher 
misperception implies higher misuse of electricity.     
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H2: The behaviour of students towards switching off lights in locked rooms is 
likely to be different across BL and FFT, FOT. 
Also, it is established in the literature that some people consider the imposition of 
fine like a price, hence it is likely that the students remain careless even after monetary 
punishment [Gneezy and Rustichini (2000); Siang (2012)]. For instance, according to 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), when parents are fined for picking up kids late from a day 
care center; the parents further delayed the arrival time instead of coming on time. 
Likewise, Siang (2012) shows that imposing fine on employees does not improve the 
attendance rate as employees consider paying fine like a price for their late coming. 
Based on this discussion the third hypothesis of the study is: 
H3: The behaviour of students across FFT and FOT might not be different.  
 
5.  EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
In this section, we discuss the findings of our analysis. We divide this section into 
three subsections. In subsection 5.1, we provide an overview of the overall findings 
across all the treatments. In addition, we discuss the decomposition of findings across the 
degree levels of the consumers. In subsection 5.2, we discuss a comparative analysis of 
the impact of each treatment on the behaviour of misusers of electricity. Finally, in 
subsection 5.3, we explore the overall impact of experiment on the overall consumption 
of electricity. 
  
5.1.  Overview of Findings Across Treatments  
Table 3 shows an overview of the overall findings across all treatments. As is 
evident from the Table, there is a continuous reduction in the percentage of locked rooms 
with inside lights switched on with the introduction of notices and the associated 
punishment. The impact of soft and harsh notices is small; however, still, it is significant 
in both cases as compared to the BT (p<0.05 and p<0.01 in both cases, respectively).
24
 
This finding is contrary to hypothesis 1 where we claim that the behaviour of students 
towards switching off lights in locked rooms is likely to be the same across BL, SNT and 
HNT. In other words, some individuals require just a reminder for reforming their 
behaviour which the soft and harsh notices in SNT and HNT respectively offer to them. 
Likewise, the comparison of SNT and HNT implies that both are almost similar in impact 
(p=0.33). This, in other words, suggests that individuals who are insensitive to notices 
behave in the same way in case of both the soft and harsh notices. It also shows the 
carelessness on part of the students towards minor changes in the wording of notices 
displayed on notice boards.
25
 Alternatively, for such students major changes in wording 
such as warning matters  may incentivise them to conserve electricity due to the increase 
in the marginal cost associated with that warning. This fact is shown by the comparison 
of HNT and WNT. As we can see from Table 3, there is a significant reduction in the 
percentage of locked rooms with the inside lights switched on in WNT as compared to 
HNT (p<0.01). Further, the introduction of monetary punishment is more effective as 
 
24This p-value is the corresponding value of z-statistic of unequal variances while using the number of 
locked rooms with inside lights switched on as observation.  
25It is possible that they might not have studied the displayed notices. 
120 Shah, Khan, and Zubair 
 
compared to warning. For instance, the percentage of locked rooms with inside lights 
switched on declines to 29.53 percent in FFT and 29.47 percent in FOT as compared to 
42.32 percent in WNT (p<0.01 in both cases). This finding is in line with hypothesis 2 
which claims that the monetary punishment is more effective. This also confirms that 
punishment decreases the issue of moral hazard or increases cooperation in the presence 
of free riding which is already established in the literature by Polinksy and Shavell 
(1984); Ilan and Sacerdote (2004); Visser, et al. (2006); and Nikiforakis and Normann 
(2008). Moreover, it is pertinent to mention that the comparison between FFT and FOT 
provides some support to the conjecture that fine is a price which is predicted by Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000). 
 
Table 3 
Part I: Overview of Findings Across Treatments 
Treatments 
Total Number of 
Locked Rooms in all 
the three Rounds 
Total Number of Locked 
Rooms with Inside 
Lights Switched On in 
all the three Rounds 
The Percentage of 
Locked Rooms with 
Lights Switched On 
BT 368 253 68.75% 
SNT 637 412 61.77% 
HNT 713 422 59.19% 
WNT 638 270 42.32% 
FFT 762 225 29.53% 
FOT 638 188 29.47% 
Total 3756 1770 47.12% 
Part II: Inferential Comparison of Treatments 
Treatments P-Value Treatments P-Value 
BT vs SNT 0.026 SNT vs FOT 0.000 
BT vs HNT 0.002 HNT vs WNT 0.000 
BT vs WNT 0.000 HNT vs FFT 0.000 
BT vs FFT 0.000 HNT vs FOT 0.000 
BT vs FOT 0.000 WNT vs FFT 0.000 
SNT vs HNT 0.332 WNT vs FOT 0.000 
SNT vs WNT  0.000 FFT vs FOT 0.984 
SNT vs FFT 0.000   
Note: The survey was conducted for three consecutive days. Therefore, the number of rooms here implies that it 
is out of the total of 1710=570*3. 
 
Most of these descriptive results are confirmed by the simple regression analysis 
which is shown in Table 4. As is evident from columns 1 to 5 in Table 4, all the dummies 
for all the treated rounds except SNT and HNT are significant in reducing the number of 
locked rooms with inside lights switched on. Column 6 confirms this finding further, 
once we incorporate the dummies for all of the treated rounds in the same regression. 
Columns 7 and 8 show an important finding that monetary punishment is more effective 
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as compared to non-monetary punishment.
26
 Alternatively, warnings associated with 
SNT, HNT and WNT, respectively are less effective as compared to monetary fines 
associated with FFT and FOT. As shown in Table 2, we have two types of hostels i.e. in 
some hostels, rooms are bi-sweaters while, in others, they are four-sweaters. 
Consequently, the punishment per resident varies across these two types as the imposed 
fine is on per room basis. In order to check the robustness across this variation, in column 
10, we add the dummy for hostels having four-sweater rooms. However, we find no 
significant difference. Our results are robust with regard to the fine burden per student. 
The overall findings can be decomposed across different units, i.e. hostels, of the 
survey. In this way, we can analyse the behaviour of students while controlling for the 
type of degrees for which they are enrolled in the university. As we have shown earlier 
that MPhil/PhD students reside in hostels 3 and 4; MSc students reside in hostels 6 and 8; 
BS students reside in hostels 7 and 9, therefore, we merge the data of these hostels by the 
level of degrees in which the resident students are enrolled. The details of this 
composition are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix A. It is evident from the Table that, 
for each level of students, the misuse of electricity declines with each successive 
treatment. In other words, in each hostel, the introduction of notices and fines has 
beneficial effects on the misuse of electricity. Thus, our results are robust to the different 
levels of educations.
27
  
 
Table 4 
Simple Regression Results 
Dependent Variables   
Percentage of Locked Rooms with Inside Light Switched On 
Impacted 
Rooms 
Number of 
Residents 
in a Room 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 60.43*** 60.31*** 60.74*** 56.53*** 51.47*** 60.43*** 56.53*** 60.43*** 31.46*** 60.55*** 
DSNT –0.25     –0.25*     
DHNT   1.30    1.17     
DWNT   –16.82***   –16.52***     
DFFT    –25.30***  –29.20***     
DFOT     –21.6*** –30.57***     
DNotices        –5.20  –5.20 
DFines       –25.99*** –29.89*** 16.30** –29.89*** 
D4R          -0.35 
N 36 54 72 90 108 108 108 108 30 108 
R2 0.0001 0.0021 0.25 0.36 0.21 0.59 0.47 0.49 0.04 0.49 
F 0.00 0.11 23.88*** 49.99*** 27.38*** 29.10*** 95.85*** 49.55*** 4.69** 32.73*** 
Note: 1. ***=p<0.01, ** = p<=0.05 and *=p<0.01. 
 2. D with each Treatment denotes dummy for that Treatment. Likewise, DNotices and DFines are 
dummies for all types of notices and fines, respectively. D4R shows the dummy for rooms with 4 
residents.  
 
5.2.  Behavioural Impact of Notices and Fines 
 
26In columns 7 and 8 we incorporated collective dummies for notices and fines.  
27In terms of impact, the MSc students are slightly superior to the MPhil/PhD and BS students. For 
instance, in a sequential sense, the percentage of locked rooms with inside lights switched on is 23.53 percent 
for MSc students which is lower as compared to 30.10 percent for PhD students and 26.76 percent for BS 
students. 
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In this section, we analyse the behavioural impact of notices and fines. In 
particular, we are interested in analysing the behaviour of those students whose rooms 
were locked with inside lights switched on in a particular treatment. For instance, we 
want to see whether the display of notices, warnings or fines in the next treatment plays 
any role in reforming their behaviour. In order to test this, we follow a sequential 
approach, i.e. we want to see the impact on behaviour in the next treatment. We capture 
such behaviour through the following formula:
28
 
BI = [(CT=0 & PT=1)/(PT=1)] ×100 
Where CT=0 implies that in current treatment the locked room has inside lights switched 
off, while PT=1 means the same locked room has inside lights switched on in the 
previous treatment. The results of this behavioural impact are shown in Table 5. As is 
evident from the Table, there were 165 rooms which were locked in both the BT and 
SNT with their inside lights switched on in BT; however, with the introduction of notices 
during SNT, the residents of 57 rooms switched off their lights. This implies that 34.55 
percent of the violators reformed their behaviour with the display of notice in SNT. 
Likewise, the harsh notice during HNT resulted in the reformation of behaviour of 35.06 
percent of the violator students during SNT. This improvement in behaviour is increasing 
with the severity of punishment. For instance, warning, Rs 500 fine and Rs 1000 fine 
ended up with the behavioural improvement of 47.16 percent, 58.95 percent, and 68.63 
percent of the students, respectively. It is also shown by P-value of Z-statistic for cross-
treatment comparison in Table 5. In particular, like the overall results, the monetary 
punishment is an effective tool in reforming the behaviour of habitual violators of rules. 
This is also confirmed by the simple regression in column 9 of Table 4 in which the 
dummy for fines is significant in reforming the behaviour of violators. Again, the 
decomposition of students by the level of their degrees shows a similar pattern. For 
instance, Table A2 in the Appendix A shows that the introduction of notices and fines 
reform the behaviour of violators in similar fashion across all three levels of education in 
hostels. 
 
Table 5 
The Impact of Each Treatment on Reforming the Behaviour of Violators
29
  
Treatments 
Number of 
Overlapped 
Locked Rooms 
with Lights 
Switched On in 
Previous 
Treatment 
Number of 
Overlapped 
Locked Rooms 
with Lights 
Switched Off in 
Current Treatment 
Percentage of 
Overlapped 
Locked Rooms 
with Lights 
Switched Off in 
Current Treatment 
Statistical 
Significance on 
the basis of Z-
statistic (P-
value<0.05) 
Impact of SNT 165 57 34.55% --- 
Impact of HNT 251 88 35.06% 0.9124 
 
28BI, CT and PT refer to Behavioural Impact, Current Treatment and Previous Treatment, respectively. 
29As a limitation of our work, we could not provide such analysis on per room basis due to data record 
issues. 
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Impact of WNT 229 108 47.16% 0.0071 
Impact of FFT 190 112 58.95% 0.0160 
Impact of FOT 51 35 68.63% 0.2077 
There is a possible limitation of our study in the sense that we are not able to 
precisely differentiate whether the locked rooms with lights switched off in the 
subsequent treatments are the outcomes of our treatment variables or random 
phenomena? For instance, we do not know whether the students read the notices 
displayed on notice boards or not? However, we run the baseline treatment three times 
and calculate the average behaviour of students regarding leaving the rooms locked with 
lights switched on. Hence, it is our observation that any change in the subsequent rounds 
can be assigned to the treatment variables. In addition, the information displayed on 
notice board is shared by students with each other. Hence, we perceive that even if a 
student has not read the notice board; still, he might have got the information. 
 
5.3.  Impact of the Experiment on the Conservation of Electricity 
In this section, we examine the probable impact of the whole experiment on the 
conservation of electricity. For this purpose, we took the electricity bills of all hostels 
from the office of Project Director (PD) of QAU. We then compared the consumed units 
of electricity for the months of December, 2014, January, 2015 and February, 2015 with 
those of the same months in 2015-2016. This comparison is provided in Table 6 which 
shows that except for the month of December, the consumption declines significantly in 
all of the remaining months. The overall impact shows that, with the experiment, the 
electricity consumption declines by 23040 KWh during these three months. This, in other 
words, suggests that if we establish an efficient monitoring system with appropriate 
punishment mechanism, we can achieve efficiency in terms of energy conservation. 
Likewise, the comparison between different levels of students demonstrates that for all 
levels except MSc students the consumption of electricity declines after the experiment.
30
 
It is pertinent to mention that, during the experiment, the hotels’ administration installed 
24 electric geysers of 1000 KW. Hence, the real impact might be under estimated due to 
this factor. One might ask about the other factors that could lead to the conservation of 
energy such as the break time between the two semesters etc.  However, we opine that 
this work compares the same months for two consecutive years, where all other factors 
including the break time are controlled for automatically. Hence, in this regard, we can at 
least perceive a correlation between the behaviour of conserving energy and the fear of 
being punished. 
 
Table 6 
Comparison of the Consumed Electricity before and after the Experiment  
(in KiloWatt-hour(KWh)) 
Months 
Before Experiment  
(2014-2015)   
(consumed units in KWh) 
After Experiment 
 (2015-2016)  
(consumed units in KWh) 
Difference between 2014-2015 
and 2015-2016  
(consumed units in KWh) 
 
30See Table A3 in the Appendix A for the details. 
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December  52280 62200 9920 
January 137320 123520 –13800 
February 196880 177720 –19160 
Total 386480 363440 –23040 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This study is motivated by the previous literature that emphasises the role of 
punishment in situations, involving moral hazard. Additional motivation is given by the 
findings with regard to the recent energy crisis in Pakistan. Inefficiency in energy 
consumption is considered as one of the major factors responsible for this crisis. In this 
study, we examine how monitoring and the associated punishment mechanism resolve 
moral hazard as far as the electricity consumption in public sector is concerned? We use 
the framework of a field experiment which comprises six treatments. The experiment was 
conducted in boys’ hostels of Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad. We focus on 
three aspects. First, we examine how monetary and non-monetary punishments 
incentivise individuals to abandon the misuse of electricity? Second, we focus on the 
behaviour of violators of rules, i.e. misusers of electricity. For instance, we investigate 
how their behaviour towards misuse changes with the severity of monetary and non-
monetary punishments. Third, we explore the overall impact of the experiment on the 
overall conservation of electricity. 
Based on our indicator of misuse, i.e. the number of locked rooms with inside 
lights switched on, our analysis shows three important findings. First, people are 
responsive to both monetary and non-monetary punishments. For instance, with the 
introduction of punishments, we observe declining trends in the ratio of locked rooms 
with inside lights switched on. In particular, the trend in this change gets steeper over the 
severity of both the non-monetary and monetary punishments. When individuals are 
informed about their misuse of electricity in a soft tone; they show a weak response in 
terms of change in their behaviour. In contrast, when they are informed in a harsh tone; 
their response enhances as compared to that of the soft tone. Likewise, the response level 
strengthens once individuals are made liable to monetary punishment. Second, the 
individuals who are habitual violators of rules show reformation in their behaviour with 
the severity of punishments. In our case, we define habitual violators of rules as those 
who regularly keep lights switched on in their locked rooms. This finding negates the 
objection which people might make that the positive response towards monetary and non-
monetary punishment may be due to new residents. Instead, our findings reveal that even 
those who are habitual violators show response to both the monetary and nonmonetary 
punishment. Again, the response to the monetary punishment is higher than that of the 
nonmonetary punishment. Third, with regard to the overall impact of the experiment, our 
finding shows that people start conserving electricity once they are made liable to 
monetary and non-monetary punishments. This is shown by the reduction in overall 
consumption of electricity after the experiment. This finding negates the doubts about the 
possible retaliation in terms of misusing the other non-visible electric appliances such as 
iron-rods. 
The study suggests that once individuals are informed about the external effects of 
their actions of moral hazard; they reform their behaviour. Consequently, if a monitoring 
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system with the associated punishment mechanism is introduced; we can have beneficial 
effects in terms of resolving the moral hazard in energy consumption. However, future 
research in this strand is certainly needed in order to have clear policy guidelines in this 
regard. For instance, this experiment is undertaken only in boys’ hostels. The same 
experiment with the same number of treatments can be done in female hostels for having 
a gender-based comparison. Likewise, the experiment is focused on students. Future 
research can examine the behaviour of employees in a public sector institution. Similarly, 
future research can also examine the issue of moral hazard by observing the use of 
electricity in the rooms for heating and cooking purposes, which is not allowed in most of 
the hostels; however, this requires physical inspection of each room. A limitation of our 
study is that hostel administration does not allow such uses to a student. Hence, we used 
“locked room with lights switched on” as a proxy for the moral hazard of using electricity 
for heating and cooking purpose. We assume that though this proxy captures the issues of 
moral hazard but it is not its perfect substitute. 
 
APPENDIX-A 
Table A1 
Part I: Overview of Findings by Different Levels of Education 
Treatments MPhil/PhD M.SC BS 
BT 72.81% 66.67% 61.11% 
SNT 65.37% 62.34% 58.56% 
HNT 60.51% 55.19% 63.33% 
WNT  41.49% 43.62% 47.13% 
FFT  30.23% 23.99% 36.67% 
FOT 30.10% 23.53% 26.76% 
 
Table A1 
Part II: Inferential Comparison of Treatments by Different Levels of Education 
(Corresponding P-Values for Each Treatment) 
BT – – – 
Impact of SNT 0.0949 0.4413 0.4593 
Impact of HNT 0.2340 0.1118 0.5028 
Impact of WNT 0.0000 0.0098 0.0054 
Impact of FFT 0.0060 0.0000 0.0477 
Impact of FOT 0.9124 0.6672 0.0588 
 
Table A2 
Part I: Impact of Each Treatment on Reforming the Behaviour of Violators  
by Different Levels of Education 
Treatments MPhil/PhD M.SC BS 
Impact of SNT 34.21% 33.96% 36.11% 
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Impact of HNT 33.62% 39.76% 30.91% 
Impact of WNT 48.51% 43.48% 49.15% 
Impact of FFT 59.49% 60.94% 55.32% 
Impact of FOT 51.00% 69.23% 68.42% 
Table A2 
Part II: Inferential Comparison of Treatments in Terms of Reformation by Different 
Levels of Education (Corresponding P-Values for Each Treatment) 
Treatments MPhil/PhD M.SC BS 
Impact of SNT – – – 
Impact of HNT 0.93624 0.4965 0.6030 
Impact of WNT 0.0271 0.64552 0.0477 
Impact of FFT 0.14156 0.04444 0.5287 
Impact of FOT 0.2757 0.57548 0.2187 
 
Table A3 
Comparison of the Consumed Electricity before and after the Experiment by the Level of 
Degrees (in KiloWatt-hour(KWh)) 
Months 
MPhil/PhD Students MSc Students BS Students 
2014-
2015 
2015-
2016 
2014-
2015 
2015-
2016 
2014-
2015 
2015-
2016 
December 19520 21000 17240 22480 15520 18720 
January 51600 48240 42120 50240 43600 25040 
February 66280 64000 68600 58440 62000 55280 
Total 137400 133240 127960 131160 121120 99040 
Net Difference –4160 3200 –22080 
Note: The Net Difference is total units consumed in 2015 subtracted from those in 2014.  
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Fig. A1.  Overview of Findings Across Treatments
 
Fig. A2.  Decomposition of Students by the Level of Degrees 
 
 
Fig. A3. The Impact of Each Treatment in Reforming the Behaviour of Violators 
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Fig. A4.  The Impact of Each Treatment in Reforming the Behaviour of  
Violators by the Level of Degrees 
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APPENDIX-B 
In this appendix we provide the copies of the notices that we used for different 
treatments.                          
 
B1 Copy of the Notice for SNT 
 
Notice for the Economical use of Electricity in Hostels 
It has been observed that some of the boarders do not switch-off lights/other 
electrical appliances while leaving their rooms. As we all know the current critical 
situation of a wider gap between supply and demand of electricity culminating into ever-
worst situation of load-shedding, hence we utterly need to adopt a habit of judicious use 
of electricity.  
Therefore, all the residents of the boys hostels are advised to ensure switch-off the 
bulbs, fans etc. as and when they leave their respective rooms.                                        
                                                                                                
        Senior Warden                                                                                    (Boys hostels)  
B2: Copy of the Notice for HNT 
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Second Notice for the Economical use of Electricity in Hostels 
It has been observed that in spite of the first notice dated 06/11/2105 for the 
economical use of electricity in hostels, most of the boarders do not switch-off lights/ 
other electrical appliances while leaving rooms locked. The current situation of wider gap 
between the supply and demand of electricity at national level is known to all. Hence, we 
need to adopt a habit of judicious use of electricity in hostels. 
Thus, all the residents of the boy’s hostels are strictly advised to ensure switch-off 
lights/ other electrical appliances etc., as and when they leave their respective rooms 
locked. In case of non-compliance warning notice will be issued to all dwelling students 
of a room.      
 
     Senior Warden                                                                               (Boys Hostels)  
 
B3:Copy of the Notice for WNT 
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY 
(Office of the resident Warden) 
No.QAU/BH/2015-                                                                           Dated:------ 
Subject: Warning 
It has been observed that in spite of repeated notices issued by this office, you do 
not switch off the lights of your room while leaving it. It is sheer negligence and wastage 
of energy resources. You are, therefore, finally warned to switch off all the lights and 
electric appliances while leaving the room. Failing to comply with the instructions, heavy 
fine will be imposed on you. 
                                                                                                      
        Resident Warden  
                                                                                                        Unit A/B/C 
Room No------- Hostel No------ 
Copy:- 
          Provost/ Senior Warden for information please.       
 
B4: Copy of the Letter FFT 
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY 
(Office of the Provost) 
No.QAU/P(BH)/2015-1916           
Dated: 25.11.2015 
Fine Notice 
With reference to this office Warning letter No.QAU/BH/2015-1875 dated 
17.11.2015 regarding misusing of lights and other electric appliances, it has been once 
again noted during physical checking. That you did not follow the instructions of this 
office and also noted that lights of your room were still switched on while the room was 
locked. 
In exercise of the powers vested in Provost under clause: 17(a) of QAU, Hostel 
Regulation, 1996 the allottees of the room are therefore fined Rs 500/- collectively (i.e. 
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Rs 125/-each in four seater room and Rs 250/-each in bi-seater room) The student (s) 
is/are therefore, directed to deposit the above mentioned fine into the authorised 
university account under intimation to this office by 07.12.2015. Failing to comply with 
instruction or refusing to receive the notification would be considered as another act of 
indiscipline/cognisable offence under the law. 
                                                                                                              
Senior Warden 
Room No.______ Hostel No___ 
Name of the allottees 
1. Name ______     Deptt    __    Sem  __ 
2. Name ______     Deptt.   __    Sem.  __ 
3. Name ______     Deptt.   __    Sem.  ___ 
4. Name ______     Deptt.   __     Sem.  __ 
 
Distribution: 
 Chairperson Concerned Department 
 Provost (Boys Hostels) 
 Controller of Examinations 
 Treasurer 
 Resident Warden with the direction to facilitate delivery of above notification to the 
concerned student at the earliest. In case of non-compliance please report back. 
 
B5: Copy of the Letter for FOT 
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY 
(Office of the Provost) 
No.QAU/P(BH)/2015-                Dated:- 02.12.2015 
Fine Notice 
With reference to this office Warning letter No.QAU/BH/2015-1875 dated 
17.11.2015 and subsequent fine of Rs 500/- collectively vide notification 
No.QAU/P(BH)/2015-1916 dated 25.11.2015 regarding the misuse of lights and other 
electric appliances, it has been found that you once again did not follow the instructions 
of this office and left the lights of your room switched on while the room was locked. The 
date of the survey of your room is dd/mm/yy at xy pm 
In exercise of the powers vested in Provost under clause: 17(a) of QAU, Hostel 
Regulation, 1996 the allottees of the room no ---xy---are therefore fined Rs 500/- each. 
All the allottee of the room is therefore, directed to deposit the above mentioned 
fine into the authorised university account under intimation to this office by 10.12.2015. 
Failing to comply with instruction or refusing to receive the notification would be 
considered as another act of indiscipline/cognisable offence under the law. 
 
Senior Warden 
Room No.______ Hostel No.___ 
Name of the allottees: 
1. Name ______     Deptt    __    Sem  __ 
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2. Name ______     Deptt.   __    Sem.  __ 
3. Name ______     Deptt.   __    Sem.  ___ 
4. Name ______     Deptt.   __     Sem.  __ 
 
Distribution: 
 Chairperson Concerned Department 
 Provost (Boys Hostels) 
 Controller of Examinations 
 Treasurer 
 Resident Warden with the direction to facilitate delivery of above notification 
to the concerned student at the earliest. In case of non-compliance please report 
back. 
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